Slovenia’s election to the United Nations safety Council, with 153 votes against Belarus’s 38, was more than a triumph over an authoritarian competitor. It confirmed Slovenia’s position as a reliable democratic actor, trusted to contribute to global stableness amid geopolitical fragmentation.
This symbolism now sits uncomfortably too the country’s home reality. With its word at the safety Council coming to an end, the Šutar Law came into force: a measurement that would let police to designate full neighbourhoods inhabited by Roma as “security zones”; grant sweeping powers to conduct identity checks without suspicion; enter homes without warrants; install surveillance equipment; and issue fines that dwarf yearly household incomes, among others. And this is the case despite the global visibility of outraged Roma voices, urgent statements from global human rights organizations and a direct appeal from the European Union to avoid violations of fundamental rights, organization safeguards and EU anti-discrimination standards.
The disconnect becomes clearer erstwhile placed against Slovenia’s actual safety conditions. It ranks among the safest countries in Europe, outperforming France, Belgium and Sweden, which face genuine debates about violent crime and policing capacity. It is besides striking given the ostensibly socially liberal roots of Prime Minister Robert Golob’s centrist governing coalition. Nations with Slovenia’s safety profile and stated commitment to upholding civilian liberties and regulation of law do not typically adopt emergency-style policing regimes. erstwhile they do, the decision frequently reveals a political calculus alternatively than a consequence to genuine threats, as seen in France’s extended emergency powers, Austria’s “Operation Sharp Sword” or Denmark’s alleged “ghetto laws”.
It is besides a model acquainted across Europe: extraordinary powers seldom begin with the majority population. They begin where political cost is lowest – with groups already subjected to disproportionate policing. Surveys consistently show that Roma experience stop-and-search rates respective times higher than national averages. Slovenia is not an exception; it is part of the pattern.
Slovenia’s safety Council candidacy gained traction due to the fact that it was considered a dependable, rights-respecting partner. It aligned with western positions on Ukraine, sanctions and humanitarian access. It signalled predictability at a time erstwhile many tiny states hedge their bets between blocs. For countries of Slovenia’s size, reliability translates to hard power. But this besides means home missteps carry greater weight. A state trusted for its democratic reliability cannot quietly dilute those standards without undermining the alliances that elevated it.
The repercussions are three-fold.
First, there is the economical impact. Across the EU, investigation shows that policing disparities feed straight into economical disadvantage. The Šutar Law’s fines – ranging from 3,000 to 20,000 euros – will fall heaviest on households already surviving in deep economical insecurity. Most Roma in Slovenia trust on informal income well below the national poorness threshold. With the at-risk-poverty line set at 981 euros per month, a single fine can exceed respective months – even a full year – of income for low-income families. These are not token penalties. They entrench long-term financial precarity and harden existing barriers to economical mobility. Embedding these disparities into law risks deepening inequality in ways that clash with Slovenia’s reputation for social cohesion.
Second, it introduces fresh technological risks. Under the EU AI Act and akin audits, facial-recognition systems show false-positive rates 5 to 10 times higher for number populations. Without rigorous verification safeguards – which the Šutar Law does not supply – algorithmic bias becomes automated discrimination. The shift from human misjudgement to machine-driven mistake does not solve the problem. In fact, it only scales it.
Third, there is possible for regional spillover. Identity-based policing measures do not stay confined to where they originate. They spread through political imitation. There is an alarming anticipation that Slovenia could now supply cover for governments in younger EU associate countries to adopt akin legislation. A precedent set by a liberal democracy travels further than 1 set by an openly illiberal state.
At the home level, the Šutar Law will reshape Slovenia’s organization structure by creating a gap between enforcement and oversight. Police powers would take effect immediately. Constitutional review typically requires around 90 days. Ombudsman investigations take at least a month. In that window, extraordinary powers can become regular practice long before legal scrutiny is completed. Slovenia’s fresh past shows that temporary policing measures introduced since 2016 have tended to become permanent. The Šutar Law risks accelerating that trajectory.
Then come the financial ramifications. The EU initially froze over 22 billion euros to Hungary and 36 billion euros to Poland under the regulation of Law Conditionality Mechanism. If applied to Slovenia, the possible vulnerability ranges from 1.6 to 3.2 billion euros in cohesion and structural funds – a crucial budgetary shock for a 63 billion-euro economy. abroad investment responds even faster than EU institutions do. erstwhile legal certainty declines, FDI contracts sharply. Hungary saw drops of 65 to 75 per cent during its judicial restructuring. Slovenia risks a akin pattern if investors interpret the Šutar Law as a sign of weakening regulation of law.
Slovenia won its seat in the UN safety Council by presenting itself as a democratic alternate to authoritarian models. But global credibility is not symbolic theatre. It shapes how allies respond, how markets behave and how institutions justice home reform. A country entrusted with contributing to global safety must guarantee that its interior choices strengthen – alternatively than weaken – the principles it claims to uphold. Slovenia cannot afford this contradiction, and neither can the institutions that placed their trust in it.
Mensur Haliti is Vice president for Democracy and Governance at the Roma Foundation for Europe, focusing on public governance, corruption control and strengthening Roma political participation.
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